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Abstract: We develop an agent-based financial market model in which agents follow 
technical and fundamental trading rules to determine their speculative investment 
positions.  A central feature of our model is that we consider direct interactions between 
speculators due to which they may decide to change their trading behavior. For instance, 
if a technical trader meets a fundamental trader and they realize that fundamental 
trading has been more profitable than technical trading in the recent past, the probability 
that the technical trader switches to fundamental trading rules is relatively high. Our 
simple setup is able to replicate some salient features of asset price dynamics. 
 
Keywords:  Agent-based financial market models; direct interactions; evolutionary 
fitness measures; technical and fundamental analysis; stylized facts of financial markets. 
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  11 Introduction 
In the recent past, a number of interesting agent-based financial market models have 
been proposed. These models successfully explain some important stylized facts of 
financial markets, such as bubbles and crashes, fat tails for the distribution of returns 
and volatility clustering. These models, reviewed, for instance, in Hommes (2006), 
LeBaron (2006), Chen et al. (2009), Lux (2009a) and Westerhoff (2009), are based on 
the observation that financial market participants use different heuristic trading rules to 
determine their speculative investment positions. Note that survey studies by Frankel 
and Froot (1986), Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkhoff (1997), and Menkhoff and Taylor 
(2007) in fact reveal that market participants use technical and fundamental analysis to 
assess financial markets. Agent-based financial market models thus have a strong 
empirical foundation.  
As is well known, technical analysis is a trading philosophy built on the 
assumption that prices tend to move in trends (Murphy 1999). By extrapolating price 
trends, technical trading rules usually add a positive feedback to the dynamics of 
financial markets, and thus may be destabilizing. Fundamental analysis is grounded on 
the belief that asset prices return to their fundamental values in the long run (Graham 
and Dodd 1951). Buying undervalued and selling overvalued assets, as suggested by 
these rules, apparently has a stabilizing impact on market dynamics. In most agent-
based financial market models, the relative importance of these trading strategies varies 
over time. It is not difficult to imagine that changes in the composition of applied 
trading rules – such as a major shift from fundamental to technical trading rules – may 
have a marked impact on the dynamics of financial markets. 
  2One goal of our paper is to provide a novel view on how financial market 
participants may select their trading rules. We do this by recombining a number of 
building blocks from three prominent agent-based financial market models. Let us 
briefly recapitulate these models: 
- Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) developed a framework in which (a continuum of) 
financial market participants endogenously chooses between different trading rules. 
The agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they tend to pick trading rules 
which have performed well in the recent past, thereby displaying some kind of 
learning behavior. The performance of the trading rules may be measured as a 
weighted average of past realized profits, and the relative importance of the trading 
rules is derived via a discrete choice model. Contributions developed in this manner 
are often analytically tractable. Moreover, numerical investigations reveal that 
complex endogenous dynamics may emerge due to an ongoing evolutionary 
competition between trading rules. Note that in such a setting, agents interact only 
indirectly with each other: their orders have an impact on the price formation which, 
in turn, affects the performance of the trading rules and thus the agents’ selection of 
rules. Put differently, an agent is not directly affected by the actions of others. 
- In Kirman (1991, 1993), an influential opinion formation model with interactions 
between a fixed number of agents was introduced. In Kirman’s model, agents may 
hold one of two views. In each time step, two agents may meet at random, and there is 
a fixed probability that one agent may convince the other agent to follow his opinion. 
In addition, there is also a small probability that an agent changes his opinion 
independently. A key finding of this model is that direct interactions between 
heterogeneous agents may lead to substantial opinion swings. Applied to a financial 
  3market setting, one may therefore observe periods where either destabilizing technical 
traders or stabilizing fundamental traders drive the market dynamics. Note that agents 
may change rules due to direct interactions with other agents but the switching 
probabilities are independent of the performance of the rules.  
- The models of Lux (1995, 1998) and Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000) also focus on 
the case of a limited number of agents. Within this approach, an agent may either be 
an optimistic or a pessimistic technical trader or a fundamental trader. The probability 
that agents switch from having an optimistic technical attitude to a pessimistic one 
(and vice versa) depends on the majority opinion among the technical traders and the 
current price trend. For instance, if the majority of technical traders are optimistic and 
if prices are going up, the probability that pessimistic technical traders turn into 
optimistic technical traders is relatively high. The probability that technical traders 
(either being optimistic or pessimistic) switch to fundamental trading (and vice versa) 
depends on the relative profitability of the rules. However, a comparison of the 
performance of the trading rules is modeled in an asymmetric manner. While the 
attractiveness of technical analysis depends on realized profits, the popularity of 
fundamental analysis is given by expected future profit opportunities. This class of 
models is quite good at replicating several universal features of asset price dynamics. 
Each of these approaches has been extended in various interesting directions. There are 
also alternative strands of research in which the dynamics of financial markets is driven, 
for instance, by nonlinear trading rules or wealth effects. For related models see, for 
instance, Day and Huang (1990), Chiarella (1992), de Grauwe et al. (1993), Li and 
Rosser  (2001), Chiarella et al. (2002), Farmer and Joshi (2002), Li and Rosser (2004), 
Rosser et al. (2003), de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) or 
  4Westerhoff (2008), among many others.  
In this paper, we seek to recombine key ingredients of the three aforementioned 
approaches to come up with a simple model that is able to match the stylized facts of 
financial markets and that offers a novel perspective on how agents may be influenced 
in selecting their trading rules. In our model, we consider direct interactions between a 
fixed number of agents, as in Kirman’ approach. However, the switching probabilities 
are not constant over time but depend on the recent performance of the rules. To avoid 
asymmetric profit measures, as in the models of Lux and Marchesi, we define a fitness 
function along the lines of the models of Brock and Hommes, i.e. we approximate the 
fitness (attractiveness) of a rule by a weighted average of current and past myopic 
profits. Replication of the dynamics of agent-based models is often a challenging 
undertaking, which is why these models are sometimes regarded with skepticism. A 
second goal of our paper is thus to come up with a setting for which replication of our 
results is rather uncomplicated, even, as we hope, for the (interested) layman. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our approach. In 
section 3, we show that our model may mimic some stylized facts of financial markets. 
We also explore how a change in the number of agents and in the frequency of their 
interactions affects the dynamics. The last section offers some conclusions.  
 
2 A basic model 
Let us first preview the structure of our model. We assume that prices adjust with 
respect to the current excess demand. The excess demand, in turn, depends on the orders 
submitted by technical and fundamental traders. While technical traders base their 
orders on a trend-extrapolation of past prices, fundamental traders place their bets on 
  5mean reversion. The relative impact of these two trader types evolves over time. We 
assume that agents regularly meet each other and talk about their past trading 
performance. As a result, traders may change their opinion and switch to a new trading 
strategy. In particular, the time-varying switching probabilities depend on the relative 
success of the rules. Numerical simulations will reveal that the fractions of technical and 
fundamental trading rules evolve over time, which is exactly what gives rise to 
interesting asset price dynamics. Now we are ready to turn to the details of the model. 
As in Farmer and Joshi (2002), the price adjustment is due to a simple log-linear 
price impact function. Such a function describes the relation between the quantity of an 
asset bought or sold in a given time interval and the price change caused by these 









t t t D W D W a P P α + + + = + ) ( 1 ,                                                                   (1) 
where   is a positive price adjustment coefficient,   and   stand for orders 
generated by technical and fundamental trading rules, and   and   denote the 
fractions of agents using these rules. Excess buying (selling) thus drives prices up 
(down). Since our model only provides a simple representation of real financial 
markets, we add a random term to (1). We assume that 
a C D F D
C W F W
α  is an IID normal random 
variable with mean zero and constant standard deviation  .  α σ
The goal of technical analysis is to exploit price trends (see Murphy 1999 for a 
practical introduction). Since technical analysis typically suggests buying the asset 
when prices increase, orders triggered by technical trading rules may be written as 
t t t
C
t P P b D β + − = − ) ( 1 .                                                                                             (2) 
The first term of the right-hand side of (2) stands for transactions triggered by an 
  6extrapolation of the current price trend. The reaction parameter   is positive and 
captures how strongly the agents react to this price signal. The second term reflects 
additional random orders to account for the large variety of technical trading rules. As 
in (1) we assume that shocks are normally distributed, i.e. 
b
β  is an IID normal random 
variable with mean zero and constant standard deviation  .  β σ
Fundamental analysis (see Graham and Dodd 1951 for a classical contribution) 
presumes that prices may disconnect from fundamental values in the short run. In the 
long run, however, prices are expected to converge towards their fundamental values. 
Since fundamental analysis suggests buying (selling) the asset when the price is below 




t P F c D γ + − = ) ( ,                                                                                            (3) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter and   is the log of the fundamental value. 
Note that we assume that traders are able to compute the true fundamental value of the 
asset. In order to allow for deviations from the strict application of this rule, we include 
a random variable 
c F
γ  in (3), where γ  is IID normally distributed with mean zero and 
constant standard deviation  .  γ σ
For simplicity, the fundamental value is set constant, i.e.  
0 = t F .                                                                                                           (4) 
Alternatively, the evolution of the fundamental value may be modeled as a random 
walk. However, in order to show that the dynamics of a financial market may not 
depend on fundamental shocks, we abstain from this. 
We furthermore assume that there are   traders in total. Let   be the number  N K
  7of technical traders. We are then able to define the weight of technical traders as 
N K W t
C
t / = .                                                                                                      (5)  
Similarly, the weight of fundamental traders is given as 
N K N W t
F
t / ) ( − = .                                                                                           (6) 
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The number of technical and fundamental trades is determined as follows. As in 
Kirman (1991, 1993), we assume that two traders meet at random in each time step, and 
that the first trader will adopt the opinion of the other trader with a certain probability 
) 1 ( δ − . In addition, there is a small probability ε  that a trader will change his attitude 
independently. Contrary to Kirman’s approach, however, the probability that a trader 
converts another trader is asymmetric and depends on the current and past myopic 
profitability of the rules (indicated by the fitness variables  C A  and  F A , which we 
define in the sequel). Suppose that technical trading rules have generated higher myopic 
profits than fundamental trading rules in the recent past. Then it is more likely that a 
technical trader will convince a fundamental trader than vice versa. Similarly, when 
fundamental trading rules are regarded as more profitable than technical trading rules, 
the chances are higher that a fundamental trader will successfully challenge a technical 
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where the probability that a fundamental trader is converted into an technical trader is 
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respectively. 
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respectively. Formulations (10) and (11) are as in Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) which, 
in turn, were inspired by Brock and Hommes (1998). Note that the fitness of a trading 
rule depends on two components. First, the agents take into account the most recent 
performance of the rules, indicated by the first terms of the right-hand side. The timing 
we assume is as follows. Orders submitted in period t-2 are executed at the price stated 
in period t-1. Whether or not these orders produce myopic profits then depends on the 
realized price in period t. Second, the agents have a memory. The memory parameter 
 measures how quickly current myopic profits are discounted. For  , 
agents obviously have no memory, while for 
1 0 ≤ ≤ d 0 = d
1 = d  they compute the fitness of a rule as 
the sum of all observed myopic profits. 
 
3 Some simulation results 
The dynamics of international financial markets display certain stylized facts (Mantegna 
and Stanley 2000, Cont 2001, Lux and Ausloos 2002). These features include a random 
  9walk-like behavior of prices, the sporadic appearance of bubbles and crashes, excess 
volatility, fat tails of the distribution of returns, and volatility clustering. To be able to 
replicate these properties, we have selected the following parameter setting:
1 
1 = a ,  ,  05 . 0 = b 02 . 0 = c ,  95 . 0 = d ,  1 . 0 = ε ,  45 . 0 = λ , 
0025 . 0 = α σ ,  , and  .  025 . 0 = β σ 0025 . 0 = γ σ
In the remaining part of the paper, we explore the dynamics of the model for different 
values of  . In particular, we increase   from 25 to 100 and to 500. In addition, for 
the case   we consider that there is more than one direct interaction between 




3.1 Setting 1:    25 = N
In our first experiment, we assume that there are only  25 = N  agents. Of course, in real 
markets we usually observe a much larger number of traders. In the first step, it can be 
assumed that these agents reflect the trading activities of larger trading institutions or of 
groups of agents who collectively behave in the same manner (think, for instance, of 
group pressure). However, in the next subsections we increase the number of agents. 
 The seven panels of figure 1 aim at illustrating what kind of dynamics our 
model may produce for a limited number of speculators. In the top panel, we see the 
development of log prices. As can be seen, prices move erratically around their 
fundamental values. There are periods where prices are close to the fundamental value 
but occasionally larger bubbles set in. A prominent example is given around time step 
                                                 
1 Interested readers should note that calibrating agent-based financial market models may be a time-
consuming and pain-staking trial and error process. Some initial progress in estimating such models has 
recently been reported by Westerhoff and Reitz (2003), Alfarano et al. (2005), Boswijk et al. (2007), 
Manzan and Westerhoff (2007), and Winker et al. (2007). 
  104000, where the distance between log prices and log fundamental values is about 0.5, 
implying a substantial overvaluation of about 65 percent.  
In the second panel, returns, defined as log price changes, are plotted. Note that 
extreme price changes are often larger than five percent, although the fundamental value 
is fixed. A constant fundamental value naturally implies that the entire volatility should 
be regarded as excess volatility. The third panel depicts the evolution of the weights of 
technical and fundamental trading strategies. As can be seen, there is a permanent 
evolutionary competition between the rules. Neither technical nor fundamental trading 
rules die out over time. We will come back to this soon. 
In the two panels below, we characterize the distribution of the returns. Let us 
start with the left-hand panel. The solid line represents the distribution of the returns of 
our model, whereas the dotted line visualizes a normal distribution with identical mean 
and standard deviation. A closer inspection reveals that the distribution of returns of our 
financial market model has more probability mass in the center, less probability mass in 
the shoulder parts and more probability mass in the tails than the normal distribution. 
Estimates of the kurtosis support this view. However, the kurtosis is an unreliable 
indicator of fat-tailedness.  
For this reason, we plot estimates of the tail index in the right-hand panel, 
varying the number of the largest observations from 0 to 10 percent. For this particular 
simulation run we obtain a tail index of about 3.7 (using the largest 5 percent of the 
observations). We found for other simulation runs that the tail index hovers around the 
range from 3.5 to 4.5, which may be slightly too high on average. Most tail indices 
estimated from real financial data seem to range between 3 and 4, and are almost always 
captured by the interval 2 to 5 (e.g. Lux 2009b). 
  11In the last two panels, we plot the autocorrelation functions for raw returns and 
for absolute returns, respectively. Absence of significant autocorrelation between raw 
returns suggests that prices advance in a random walk-like manner. Despite the sporadic 
development of bubbles and crashes, it is thus hard to predict prices within our model. 
However, the autocorrelation coefficients for absolute returns are clearly significant and 
decay slowly. The autocorrelation coefficients are even positive for more than 100 lags. 
This is also in agreement with the second panel, and is a clear sign of volatility 
clustering, as observed in many real financial markets. 
---------- Figure 1 ---------- 
From figure 1 we can also understand what is driving the dynamics of our 
model. Comparing the second and the third panel reveals that periods where technical 
analysis is rather popular are associated with higher volatility. Also, bubbles may be 
triggered in these periods. The trend-extrapolating (and highly noisy) nature of technical 
analysis has obviously a destabilizing impact on the dynamics. Note that technical 
analysis is quite profitable during the course of a bubble. As a result, more traders learn 
about this due to their interactions with other traders. Since technical analysis 
consequently gains in popularity, bubbles may possess some kind of momentum. A 
major shift from technical to fundamental analysis may be witnessed when a bubble 
collapses. A dominance of fundamental analysis then leads to a period where prices are 
closer towards fundamental values and where volatility is less dramatic.
2 
 
                                                 
2 Why do the weights of technical and fundamental analysis vary so erratically? Since prices fluctuate 
randomly it is hard for traders to make systematic profits, i.e. the difference in the fitness of the rules is 
(usually) rather limited, which, in turn, enables “spontaneous” swings in opinion. Put differently, if one of 
the rules outperformed the other one, it would also dominate the market. In addition, traders may change 
their opinion independently of market circumstances.  
  123.2 Setting 2:    100 = N
Now we turn to the case with   traders. Figure 2 may be directly compared with 
figure 1, since it is based on the same simulation design. The only difference is that the 
number of traders is quadrupled. As indicated by the third panel, the popularity of the 
trading strategies now varies only very slowly over time. Therefore, there are extremely 
long periods where one or the other trading strategy dominates the market, which has 
some obvious consequences for the dynamics. For instance, between time steps 1500 
and 2700 the majority of traders rely on fundamental analysis, and hence we find a 
period where prices are more or less in line with fundamental values and where absolute 
returns are rather low. Afterwards, technical analysis gains in strength and for the next 
2000 time steps volatility is elevated. Since the model is calibrated to daily data, 2000 
time steps correspond to a time span of about 8 years. Although some stylized facts may 
still be replicated for   agents, the dynamics of our model appears less 
convincing than before. 
100 = N
100 = N
---------- Figure 2 ---------- 
Apparently, to generate realistic dynamics, the popularity of technical and 
fundamental trading rules has to vary more quickly, at least from a technical point of 
view. If there are only 25 traders, it may – in an extreme scenario – only take 25 time 
steps to accomplish a regime change from pure technical to pure fundamental analysis 
(or vice versa). An increase in the number of agents naturally increases the duration of 
such a complete regime switch. As seen in figure 2, regime changes may take a very 
long time if the number of agents is equal to 100 (of course, internal and external factors 
delay regime changes). In the next section, we try to show that this is not directly a 
“problem” of setting the number of agents too high. To achieve a reasonable fit of actual 
  13market dynamics with our model, the relation between the number of agents and the 
number of direct interactions between them per trading time step has to be within 
certain limits. 
  
3.3 Setting 3:    500 = N
Let us increase the number of agents up to  500 = N . In addition, let us assume that 
there is not only one direct interaction between the agents per trading time step but that 
there are 20 contacts. Clearly, we now always run the interaction part of the model 20 
times before we iterate the trading part of the model. As a result, the whole system may 
then again complete a full regime turn from pure fundamental to pure technical analysis 
(or the other way around) within 25 trading time steps. 
  Figure 3 presents the results. The qualitative similarities between figure 1 and 
figure 3 are striking. We recover bubbles and crashes, excess volatility, fat tails for the 
distribution of the returns, absence of autocorrelation for raw returns, and volatility 
clustering, i.e. our model again mimics key stylized facts of financial markets quite 
well.  
---------- Figure 3 ---------- 
Two further comments are required. Note first that periods of high volatility may 
or may not be associated with bubbles and crashes. It may thus happen that prices 
fluctuate wildly around fundamental values. We consider it interesting that there is not a 
strict one-to-one relation between high volatility and bubble periods.
3 Finally, although 
the model once again generates a distribution which deviates from the normal 
distribution, in the sense that there is more probability mass in its tails, the fat-tailedness 
                                                 
3 This implies that technical analysis may also outperform fundamental analysis in a non-bubble period; 
otherwise its weight – which is driven by the agent’s learning behavior – would not have increased. 
  14could be stronger. For the underlying simulation run we compute a tail index of 4.3. 




3.4 Robustness of the dynamics 
Instead of performing a larger and more sophisticated Monte Carlo study to check the 
robustness of our results, we restrict ourselves in the following to presenting and 
discussing additional simulation runs. The reason for doing this is that we strongly 
believe in the strength of the human eye, which has a remarkable ability to identify both 
regularities and irregularities in time series. It is also instructive to inspect single 
simulation runs. Phenomena such as bubbles and crashes or volatility outbursts are 
infrequent, irregular phenomena, and by measuring them with certain statistics their true 
nature is at least partially lost. However, we ascertained that a more elaborate statistical 
analysis would also confirm the robustness of the dynamics.
4 
Figure 4 displays four repetitions of the first three panels of figure 1. The only 
difference between figure 1 and figure 4 is that we have exchanged the seeds for the 
random variables. Note that all simulation runs are characterized by an endogenous 
competition between the trading rules. Volatility clustering is always visible, whereas 
bubbles and crashes may be absent for longer time periods or may evolve on a smaller 
scale. However, and this is one of the reasons why we should pay attention to these 
simulation runs, the panels show us that even after a very long time period without 
significant mispricing the next bubble may be just about to kick in. This warning may 
have a philosophical attitude but, given the common sense of policy makers, it seems 
                                                 
4 Also “modest” changes in the parameter setting do not destroy the model’s ability to mimic actual asset 
price dynamics reasonably well. 
  15important to us to note that even a stable period of, say, 10 years does not guarantee that 
the future will also be stable. A major bull or bear market period may just be days away 
without much forewarning.  
---------- Figure 4, 5 and 6 ---------- 
  Figure 5 extends the analysis for  100 = N  traders. In all simulation runs we see 
that the degree of volatility clustering is presumably exaggerated. The reason for this is 
that swings in opinion take too much time. Finally, figure 6 demonstrates that our model 
may generate realistic dynamics for a scenario with  500 = N  agents and 20 direct 
interactions per trading time step.  
 
4 Conclusions 
The goal of this paper is to develop a simple agent-based financial market model with 
direct interactions between the market participants. When the traders meet each other 
within our model, they compare the past success of their trading rules. Should an agent 
discover that his opponent uses a more profitable strategy, it is quite likely that he/she 
will change his/her strategy. Simulations reveal that such a setting may incorporate a 
permanent evolutionary competition between the trading rules. For instance, there may 
be periods where fundamental analysis dominates the markets. Prices then fluctuate in 
the vicinity of their fundamental values. However, at some point in time a major shift 
towards technical analysis may set in and the market becomes unstable. Besides an 
increase in volatility, spectacular bubbles and crashes may materialize.  
Moreover, we have demonstrated that our model may generate realistic 
dynamics for a lower or higher number of traders. However, in the latter case we have 
to increase the number of interactions per trading time step. Otherwise the relative 
  16importance of the trading rules is not flexible enough – due to the assumed tandem 
recruitment process. Of course, one could also consider increasing the number of agents 
further, say, to 5000 traders. Interesting dynamics may still be recovered as long as the 
number of contacts between the agents per trading time step is appropriately adjusted. 
One interesting extension of the current setup may be to consider that (also) the 
probability that an agent changes his opinion independently from social interactions is 
state dependent. One could, for instance, assume that the probability to switch from a 
technical to a fundamental attitude is relatively high if fundamental analysis 
outperforms technical analysis. In this sense, the agents would then (also) display some 
kind of individual economic reasoning behavior. 
Finally, we would like to point out that, with a bit of experience, it is quite 
simple to program our model. It should therefore be possible, even for interested 
laymen, to reproduce the dynamics of our model. From a scientific point of view, 
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  21Legends for figures 1-6 
 
Figure 1: The first three panels show the evolution of log prices, the returns, and the 
weights of technical trading rules, respectively. The left-hand panel in the fourth line 
depicts the distribution of the returns (the dotted line gives the corresponding normal 
distribution), whereas the left-hand panel presents estimates of the tail index. The 
bottom two panels depict the autocorrelation coefficients of raw and absolute returns, 
respectively. The simulation is based on 5000 time steps (omitting a longer transient 
period) and   traders. The remaining parameters are specified in section 3.  25 = N
 
Figure 2: The same simulation design as in figure 1, except that we now consider 
 agents.  100 = N
 
Figure 3: The same simulation design as in figure 1, except that we now consider 
 agents and 20 direct interactions per trading time step.   500 = N
  
Figure 4: Four repetitions of figure 1 using different random number streams. 
 
Figure 5: Four repetitions of figure 2 using different random number streams. 
 
Figure 6: Four repetitions of figure 3 using different random number streams. 
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